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Abstract: This study aims to examine the effect of the implementation of corporate governance on 
bond ratings and yields. We used the sample of firms that issued bonds in Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during the period 2007-2011. Pool the Data observation period started on January 1, 2007 to 
December 31, 2011. Data obtained from PT PEFINDO ratings that bond rating is an independent 
institution in Indonesia. Data were analyzed by using logistic regression analysis (logit) and 
multivariate regression. Logit analysis is used to test the effect of corporate governance on bond 
ratings. Multivariate regression analysis is used to test the effect of corporate governance on bond 
yields. The results show that not all elements of corporate governance ratings and bond yields affect. 
The number of independent commissioners’ positive effect on bond ratings and a negative effect on 
bond yields. In addition, the existence of an audit committee, statistically significant negative effect 
on bond yields. This shows that the existence of an audit committee is a variable to be considered by 
investors in the bond investment. 
Keywords: corporate governance; bond ratings in Indonesia; bond yield 
JEL Classification: M40; M41 
 
1. Introduction  
Bond is a debt instrument offered by the issuer which is also called the debtor or 
borrower to repay to the investor (lender) amount borrowed plus interest over a 
specified year. Until 2011, the Indonesia Stock Exchange had 102 listed companies 
are issuing bonds and 220 bonds traded. This shows the bond market is an 
instrument that can be used as an alternative investment. 
Investors prefer to invest in bonds rather than stocks for two reasons, namely: (1) 
the volatility of the stock is higher than the bond, thereby reducing the 
attractiveness of investing in stocks, and (2) bonds offer a positive rate of return on 
fixed incomes (fixed income), so as to guarantee the bonds more than stocks. In 
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determining bond investments, investors face the problem of information caused by 
varying the characteristics of the bond issuer. Rating bonds issued by an 
independent agency to help reduce the problem of information. In addition to the 
ratings, other factors considered by investors return bonds are bonds. 
In 2001, the National Committee on Corporate Governance published guidelines 
for good corporate governance. This guide aims to make the business world has 
adequate basic reference regarding the concept and implementation of good 
corporate governance patterns in accordance with the international pattern of 
general and Indonesia in particular. Researches on corporate governance in 
Indonesian bonds are still rare research. This is due to lack of data and knowledge 
bonds to bond investors. 
The purpose of this study was to test the effect of the application of corporate 
governance on bond ratings and yields. The results of this study are expected to 
provide insight to the reader in making an investment in bonds, especially in 
considering the application of corporate governance on corporate publishers. This 
study raised the issue of the influence of corporate governance on bond ratings and 
yields. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance arising from the company's interests to ensure that the party 
funding (principal/investor) that invested funds are used appropriately and 
efficiently. In addition to corporate governance, the company gave the assurance 
that the management (agent) to act in the best interests of the company. 
Implementation of corporate governance provides four benefits (FCGI, 2001), 
namely: (1) improve corporate performance through the creation process of making 
better decisions, improve the efficiency of the company, and further improve 
services to stakeholders, (2) facilitate obtaining funds cheaper financing and not 
rigid (because of the belief) that will ultimately improve corporate value, (3) 
restore the confidence of investors to invest in Indonesia, and (4) shareholders will 
be satisfied with the performance of the company as well as will enhance 
shareholders' s values and dividends. 
One of the principles of corporate governance, according to the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is related to the role of the 
board of commissioners. Form commissioners depending on the legal system 
adopted.  
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2.2. Bond Rating 
The Bond represents medium-term debt securities that are transferable long, that 
contains a promise from the issuing party to pay interest in return for a certain 
period and repay the principal amount at a specified time to the purchasers of the 
bonds. Bonds provide a fixed income to the owner during the period of validity of 
the debt. 
Bond rating is an indicator of the timeliness of payment of principal and interest 
bond debt. Bond ratings also reflect the scale of the risk of all bonds traded. Thus 
the bond ratings indicate the scale of the security bond to pay principal and interest 
obligations in a timely manner. The higher the rank, the more shows that the bonds 
avoid the risk of default. 
 
2.3. Bond Yield 
Another factor that is used as a consideration in investment bonds is the yield. 
Yield is a measure of factors that annual returns will be accepted by the investor, or 
the results will be obtained if the investors to invest their funds in bonds. There are 
two terms in the determination of yield, the current yield and yield to maturity 
(Fabozzi, 2000). Current yield is the annual coupon relation to the market price of 
bonds. Current yield formula is: 
Current Yield = annual dollar coupon interest current yield/price 
Yield to maturity (YTM) is the rate of return that would be obtained if the investor 
has a bond until maturity. 
 
2.4. Agency Theory 
Agency relationship is a contract between the principal agents. The essence of the 
agency relationship is the separation between ownership (principal/investor) and 
control (agent/manager). Ownership is represented by investors who delegate 
authority to the agent in this case the manager to manage the wealth of investors. 
Investors have hopes that the delegation of management authority, they would 
benefit by increasing investor wealth and prosperity. 
Agency relationship can cause problems when the parties involved have different 
objectives. Owners of capital require increasing the wealth and prosperity of the 
owners of capital, while the manager also wants increased prosperity for managers. 
Thus arose a conflict of interest between the owners (investors) with the manager 
(agent). The contract is made between the owner of the managers are expected to 
minimize the conflict between the two interests. 
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2.5. Hypotheses 
Evans et al. (2002) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
structure and corporate performance degradation with the sample companies in 
Australia. Evans et al. (2002) reported that there is no positive relationship between 
the ratio statistically significant independent commissioners with the company's 
performance. 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examined the effect of corporate governance on bond 
ratings and yields. In this study, a proxy of corporate governance and institutional 
ownership is an independent commissioner. The results obtained by these studies 
indicate that the percentage of institutional ownership and the proportion of 
independent commissioners positively associated with bond ratings. While the 
percentage of institutional ownership and the proportion of independent 
commissioners negatively related to bond yields. 
Therefore, the hypothesis to test the effect of institutional ownership and 
independent commissioners’ ratings and bond yields are: 
H1a:  
There is a positive effect between institutional ownership with bond ratings. 
H1b:  
There is a positive effect between the independent commissioners with bond ratings. 
H2a:  
There is a negative effect between institutional ownership with bond yields. 
H2b:  
There is a negative effect of the independent commissioner with bond yields. 
Cotter and Silvester (2003) study focuses on the composition of the board of 
directors and the supervisory committee (audit committee and compensation 
committee) in companies in Australia. This study proves that there is a positive 
relationship between the proportion of independent and oversight committee on the 
performance of companies with multiple regression analysis. 
The effect of corporate governance and audit committee studied by Turley and 
Zaman (2004), to evaluate and synthesize some previous research on corporate 
governance relating to the audit committee. The study reported that evidence 
suggests a positive relationship between the existence of an audit committee with 
the quality and performance of the company's financial statements. 
Therefore, the hypotheses to test the effect of the audit committee of the rank and 
bond yields are: 
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H1c:  
There is a positive effect between audit committee with bond ratings. 
H2c:  
There is a negative effect of the audit committee with bond yields. 
Sharma (2004) examined the effect of the board characteristics and ownership of 
the institution fraud. The results found in this study suggest that managerial 
ownership is not a statistically significant effect on the existence of fraud in the 
company. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), examined the effect of the composition of the test 
board of commissioners and the incentives that the company's performance. This 
study uses managerial ownership as independent variables. The results of this study 
showed that the higher the percentage of managerial ownership will degrade the 
performance of the company. 
Based on these studies, the hypothesis to test the effect of managerial ownership on 
bond yields and ratings are: 
H1d:  
There is a negative effect between managerial ownership with bond ratings. 
H2d:  
There is a positive effect between managerial ownership with bond yields. 
This study uses audit quality, firm size, and debt to equity ratio to the control 
variables, as done by Sanders and Allen (1993), Raman and Wilson (1994), Ziebart 
and Reiter (1992), and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This study used samples of all bonds outstanding in the period 2007-2011. The 
period of observation data pool made from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2011. 
Data obtained ratings of PT PEFINDO which is an independent agency bonds in 
Indonesia. Purposive sample selection is done, the criteria bonds issued by 
companies that are not included in the banking industry, finance, and insurance; 
bonds issued and outstanding during the observation period; bonds issued by 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period 1 January 2007 
through December 31, 2011; bonds are still active on the market and listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange OTC FIS, and the bond issuer company listed in the 
rating of the bonds issued by PT PEFINDO during the period of observation.  
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3.2. Variables Measurement 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
Variable ratings (RATING) is determined by ranking classifies by category 
ranking. Is represented by a dummy variable, which is 0 if the entry in the 
category of speculative grade (high default) and 1 if in the investment grade 
category (default is low). Bond yield (YTM) calculated with the approach 
yield to maturity (YTM). YTM is the profit earned by the bondholders until 
the bond matures. YTM has accounted for the element of interest and the 
time value of money. 
 
3.2.2. Independent Variable 
Institutional ownership (INST) is a proxy of corporate governance. This variable is 
the amount of shares held by institutions divided by total shares outstanding. Test 
results are expected to rank the signs of a positive coefficient. Instead the results of 
tests on bond yields are expected negative coefficient sign. 
Independent commissioner (KIND) is one proxy of corporate governance. This 
variable is measured by the ratio between the numbers of independent 
commissioners with the number of commissioners on the publishing company. Test 
results are expected to rank the signs of a positive coefficient. Instead the results of 
tests on bond yields are expected negative coefficient sign. 
The audit committee (KAUD) is a committee formed by the commissioner as 
required under guidelines established corporate governance. Measurements made 
by the audit committee existence of audit committees on corporate issuers. The 
audit committee is measured by ordinal scale, e.g. 0 if there is no audit committee 
and 1 if there is an audit committee. Test results are expected to rank the signs of a 
positive coefficient. Instead the test results are expected to yield a negative 
coefficient sign. 
Managerial ownership (KMAN) is the presence or absence of commissioners and 
directors who hold shares in the companies where they served as commissioners 
and directors. It uses a dummy variable, which is 0 if there is no managerial 
ownership and 1 if there is managerial ownership. In this study the managerial 
ownership is expected to negatively affect the rating of the bonds, and positively 
related to bond yields. 
 
3.3. Model Analysis 
This study uses logistic regression analysis techniques (logit) and 
multivariate regression. Logit analysis is used to examine the effect of 
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corporate governance on bond ratings (Kamstra et al., 2001). Multivariate 
regression analysis is used to examine the effect of corporate governance on 
bond yields, referring to tests performed by Jewell and Livingston (1998) 
and research Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). 
The research model used in testing hypothesis 1 is: 
RATINGit+1 = a0 + a1INSTit+ a2KINDit + a3KAUDit + a4KMANit + a5KUAit + a6LTAit 
+ a7DERit + ε 
Description: 
RATINGit +1 = rating of corporate bonds issued by PT PEFINDO, in April after years of 
observation. These variables are categorical, e.g. 0 = speculative grade, 1 = investment grade. 
INST = institutional ownership, as indicated by the percentage of common stock owned by 
institutions. 
KIND = independent commissioners, as indicated by the percentage of the commissioners who have 
no connection with the company's management. 
KAUD = audit committee, is a dummy variable, 0 if there is no audit committee, 1 if there is an audit 
committee. 
KMAN = managerial ownership, a dummy variable, 0 if there is no managerial ownership, 1 if there 
is managerial ownership. 
KUA = audit quality, a dummy variable, 0 if audited by non-Big 4 Firm, Firm 1 if audited by Big 4. 
LTA = natural logarithm of total asset size of the firm. 
DER = ratio of total liabilities divided by total equity. 
While the research model used in testing hypothesis 2 is: 
YTMit+1 = a0 + a1INSTit+ a2KINDit + a3KAUDit + a4KMANit + a5KUAit + a6LTAit 
+ a7DERit + ε 
Description: 
YTM it +1 = yield corporate bonds are calculated based on the price of bonds in April after years of 
observation. 
INST = institutional Ownership, as indicated by the percentage of common stock owned by 
institutions. 
KIND = independent Commissioners, as indicated by the percentage of the commissioners who have 
no connection with the company's management. 
KAUD = Audit Committee, is a dummy variable, 1 if there is an audit committee, 0 if there is no 
audit committee. 
KMAN = Managerial Ownership, a dummy variable, 0 if there is no managerial ownership, 1 if there 
is managerial ownership. 
KUA = audit quality, a dummy variable, 0 if audited by non-Big 4 Firm, Firm 1 if audited by Big 4. 
LTA = natural logarithm of total asset size of the firm. 
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DER = ratio of total liabilities divided by total equity 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Hypothesis 1 Testing Results 
After testing, the test results for the Logit first hypothesis is as follows: 
Table 1. Logit Testing for First Hypothesis (H1) 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1(a)   INST 
KIND 
KAUD 
KMAN 
KUA 
LTA 
DER 
Constant 
-0.002 
0.073 
-0.098 
1.00 
2.11 
-0.939 
-0.001 
26.8 
0.041 
0.036 
1.07 
1.05 
1.13 
0.418 
0.002 
12.1 
0.003 
3.950 
0.008 
0.915 
3.497 
5.050 
0.675 
4.847 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.960 
0.047 
0.927 
0.339 
0.061* 
0.025 
0.411 
0.028 
0.998 
1.07 
0.906 
2.73 
8.36 
0.391 
0.999 
0.541 
* Significant at α = 0.10 
 
From these results, Logit equation can be expressed as follows: 
P
P
Ln


1
 = 26,813 - 0,002INST + 0,073 KIND - 0,098 KAUD + 1,006 + KMAN + 2,119 
KUA - 0,939 LTA - 0,001 DER 
 
Testing of hypothesis 1 proves that independent commissioners showed 
statistically significant results at α = 0.05, is shown with a significance of 0.047 
(<0.05). Based on this evidence, we can conclude that this study reject H1b. Signs 
positive coefficient is consistent with the expected investigators that the greater the 
number of independent commissioners’ bond ratings will be higher. Positive 
coefficient is consistent with research Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) which showed 
that the number of independent commissioners positively associated with bond 
ratings. The results of this study indicate that the bond ratings of the number of 
independent commissioners as a regulatory agency and a variable value of the 
company as a major determinant of bond ratings. 
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4.2. Hypothesis 2 Testing Results 
Analysis of the test for the second hypothesis with multiple regression is as 
follows: 
Table 2. Multiple Regression Testing Second Hypothesis (H2) 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
_ 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
 
 
t 
 
Sig. 
B Error Beta 
       (Constant) 
INST 
KIND 
KAUD 
KMAN 
KUA 
LTA 
DER 
10.928 
  0.010 
 - 0.054 
-2.106 
 - 0.262 
-2.569 
  0.414 
 - 0.002 
4.366 
 0.013 
 0.016 
 0.419 
 0.410 
 0.572 
 0.141 
 0.001 
 
 0.051 
- 0.279 
- 0.370 
- 0.046 
- 0.429 
 0.244 
- 0.125 
2.503 
1.775 
-3.447 
-5.025 
- 0.639 
-4.488 
2.930 
-1.597 
0.018 
0.345 
0.001 
0.002 
0.534 
0.000 
0.005 
0.324 
 
From these results, the results of multiple regression equations test the second 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
YTM = 10,928 + 0,010INST - 0,054KIND - 2,106KAUD - 0,262KMAN - 2,569KUA + 
0,414LTA - 0,002DER 
Testing of hypothesis 2 proves that independent commissioners, audit committee, 
and audit quality showing the results are statistically significant at α = 0.05, is 
shown with a significance of 0.001; 0.002; 0.000 (<0.05). Signs negative 
coefficient is consistent with the expected investigators that the greater the number 
of independent commissioners lowers the bond yield. The negative coefficient is 
consistent with research Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) which showed that the 
number of independent commissioners negatively related to bond yields. In 
accordance with the H1b which shows that the number of independent 
commissioners positive effect on the ratings, as well as testing of H2b indicating 
that the number of independent commissioners negative effect is statistically 
significant for bond yields. This shows that the number of independent 
commissioners is one of the variables to be considered investors in investing in 
bonds. The numbers of independent commissioners are expected to maximize the 
company's value. The higher the value of the company will reduce risk and raise 
the price of bonds, so bond yields lower. 
Tests on the H2c prove that the existence of audit committee shows the results are 
statistically significant at α = 0.05, is shown with a significance of 0.000. Based on 
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this evidence, we can conclude that this study refused H2c. The negative 
coefficient signs are as expected by the researchers that the audit committee will 
lower the bond yield. H2c Test results showed that the presence of audit committee 
will lower the company's risk. The existence of an audit committee increases the 
value of the company, so that investors would be willing to buy the bonds at a 
higher price. Thus, if the risk was low, bond prices high, the yield at the lower. 
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research 
This study aims to examine the effect of the implementation of corporate 
governance on bond ratings and yields. This study uses the sample of firms that 
issued bonds in Indonesia Stock Exchange during the period 2006-2008. Pool the 
data observation period started on January 1, 2006 to December 31, 2008. Data 
obtained from PT PEFINDO ratings that bond rating is an independent institution 
in Indonesia. 
Data were analyzed by using logistic regression analysis (logit) and multivariate 
regression. Logit analysis is used to test the effect of corporate governance on bond 
ratings. Multivariate regression analysis is used to test the effect of corporate 
governance on bond yield.  
Based on the results of testing the hypothesis, this study provides some empirical 
evidence in the form of: first, not all elements of corporate governance rankings 
and influence on bond yields. Second, the number of independent commissioners’ 
positive effect on bond ratings and the negative impact on bond yields. Third, the 
existence of the audit committee was statistically significant negative effect on 
bond yields. This suggests that the existence of an audit committee variables 
considered by investors in investment bonds. 
For further research, sample selection should include banking, finance and 
insurance, and include all listed companies to issue bonds in the capital market in 
Indonesia. Future studies can also use the ratings and bond yields in the aftermath 
of the announcement of the implementation of corporate governance. 
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